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Abstract—We study private two-terminal hypothesis testing
with simple hypotheses where the privacy goal is to ensure
that participating in the testing protocol reveals little additional
information about the other user’s observation when a user is told
what the correct hypothesis is. We show that, in general, mean-
ingful correctness and privacy cannot be achieved if the users do
not have access to correlated (but, not common) randomness. We
characterize the optimal correctness and privacy error exponents
when the users have access to non-trivial correlated randomness
(those that permit secure multiparty computation).
Index Terms—distributed hypothesis testing, secure multiparty
computation, privacy, error exponents
I. INTRODUCTION
Hypothesis testing is a basic statistical inference problem
with a long history [1]–[4]. Multi-terminal hypothesis testing,
or distributed detection, where data is distributed in space,
has also been widely studied, e.g., [5]–[8] where the primary
interest is the communication required to carry out hypothesis
testing. More recently, there has been a renewed interest on
this question, see, e.g., [9]–[17] and references therein. When
data is distributedly observed by different users, a natural
question of interest is whether inference can be carried out
while providing some privacy for the users and what, if any,
trade-offs exist between the accuracy of inference and privacy.
Several recent works have explored this question mostly when
there are a large number of users each of whom observe a
small part of the data [17]–[25].
We study two-terminal binary hypothesis testing [5], [6],
[8] with simple hypotheses. Instead of restricting the amount
of communication between the user as these works did, our
focus will be on guaranteeing privacy to the two users. Our
definition of privacy is inspired by the definition of secure
multiparty (function) computation (MPC) [26]. In 2-user MPC,
the goal is for each user to learn little additional information
as possible about the input and output of the other user than
what the user can infer from its own input and output. In other
words, the protocol reveals just enough information about the
other user’s data to compute the function, but not much more.
i.e., compared to when the user is simply told the evaluation
of the function, each user gains little additional knowledge
about the other user’s data. For the 2-user distributed binary
hypothesis testing problem we study here, our privacy goal
is to ensure that participating in the protocol reveals little
additional information about the other user’s observation when
a user is told what the correct hypothesis is (see Definition 1).
First we show that meaningful correctness and privacy
cannot be achieved, in general, if the users do not have
access to correlated (but, not just common) randomness. This
is analogous to the well-known fact that two-user MPC is
also impossible without such stochastic resources [27]–[29].
Indeed, we demonstrate this by reducing two-user MPC of
the binary AND function to a two-terminal private binary
hypothesis testing problem.
Our main result is a trade-off between the optimal error and
privacy error exponents in the setting where the users have
access to any correlated randomness which permits MPC. We
do this by effectively reducing the problem to MPC of the
decision function. The optimal trade-off is thus the best trade-
off possible when the users are simply given the output of the
decision function by a genie (i.e., a trusted third party).
We note that Andoni et al. [22], among other things,
also studied two-terminal private hypothesis testing. Their
definition of privacy is also inspired by MPC, but is different
from ours. They deem a protocol private as long as it is a
MPC of any decision function with a good probability of error
performance. This may not allow comparison of the privacy
of different protocols, e.g., two decision functions may have
similar error performances, but, they may have different worst-
case privacy performance measured in terms of the information
the decision function itself reveals to a user, conditioned
on its observation, about the other user’s observation. Here,
we define privacy from first principles and arrive at MPC
as a means to achieve it. Our definition also allows us to
compare the privacy of protocols and obtain the optimal trade-
off between the error and privacy error exponents.
II. NOTATION
When X is a random variable and E is an event, p (X|E)
represents the distribution induced by X conditioned on event
E. When (X,Y ) is jointly distributed, and E is an event,
p (X|Y,E) is a distribution over distributions on X , such
that the distribution p (X|Y = y,E) occurs with probability
P(Y = y|E). Total variation distance between distributions
PXY and QXY is denoted by ‖PXY −QXY ‖TV.
We use the method of types and follow the notation of Cover
and Thomas [30] . The type of a sequence xn ∈ Xn is denoted
by Txn . The set of types of Xn is PnX = {Txn : xn ∈ Xn}.
Finally, for PX ∈ PnX , type class of PX , denoted by TnX (PX),
is the set of all sequences of type PX , i.e., TnX (PX) = {xn ∈
Xn : Txn = PX}.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In a distributed binary hypothesis testing problem of sample
size n, Alice and Bob observe Xn and Y n, respectively, where
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(Xn, Y n) is drawn independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) according to the distribution P0XY under the null
hypothesis Θ = 0 and P1XY under the alternate hypothesis
Θ = 1. Here, random variable Θ ∈ {0, 1} represents the
true hypothesis. Independent of the observations, Alice and
Bob have access to potentially dependent random variables
WA,WB , respectively. Alice and Bob engage in an interactive
communication protocol pin in which they take turns exchang-
ing messages with each other. Messages produced by each user
is a function of their observation, randomness, and messages
exchanged so far. At the end of the protocol, both users output
their decision. Let VA (resp., VB) denote the view of Alice
(resp., Bob) at the end of the protocol; this is the collection
of the observations Xn, randomness WA and the transcript.
Let the decision function of Alice (resp., Bob) be denoted
by ψA : VA → {0, 1} (resp., ψB : VB → {0, 1}) and the
decision itself by ĤA = ψA(VA) (resp., ĤB). Note that for
pin to be a valid protocol, it must satisfy the natural conditional
independence statement that each message produced by a
user must be a function of what the users knows when it
is produced. In this exposition, we consider the honest but
curious model of security in which Alice and Bob are obliged
to follow the protocol honestly but can be curious, in that,
they might try to infer the other user’s observation from their
respective views.
The protocol naturally induces the following joint distri-
bution p
(
Θ, Xn, Y n,WA,WB , VA, VB , ĤA, ĤB
)
. For i, j ∈
{0, 1}, when I is the indicator function, this distribution can
be described as follows.
P(θ, xn, yn, wA, wB , vA, vB , ĤA = i, ĤB = j)
= PΘ(θ) · PXn,Y n|Θ(xn, yn|θ) · PWA,WB (wA, wB)
· Ppin(vA, vB |xn, yn, wA, wB)
· I(ψA(vA) = i) · I(ψB(vB) = j). (1)
Definition 1 (Private Binary Hypothesis Testing). A protocol
pin is said to be an (n, δ, µ)-private distributed binary hypoth-
esis testing protocol if for a sample size n, the distribution
induced by pin given in (1) satisfies δ-correctness and µ-
privacy conditions given below.
a) Correctness: For δ ≥ 0, pin is said to be δ-correct if
P
(
ĤA = 1− θ|Θ = θ
)
≤ δ, (2)
P
(
ĤB = 1− θ|Θ = θ
)
≤ δ. (3)
b) Privacy: For µ ≥ 0, pin is said to be µ-private if for
θ = 0, 1,
P (‖p (Y n|xn, θ)− p (Y n|VA, xn, wA, θ) ‖TV ≥ µ) ≤ µ,
∀xn, wA
P (‖p (Xn|yn, θ)− p (Xn|VB , yn, wB , θ) ‖TV ≥ µ) ≤ µ,
∀ yn, wB .
Definition 2 (Weakly Private Binary Hypothesis Testing). A
protocol pin is said to be an (n, δ, µ)-weakly private distributed
binary hypothesis testing protocol if it satisfies δ-correctness
conditions (2) and (3), and µ-weak privacy conditions given
below.
c) Weak privacy: For µ ≥ 0, pin is said to be µ-weakly
private if for θ = 0, 1,
P (‖p (Y n|Xn, θ)− p (Y n|VA, Xn, θ) ‖TV ≥ µ) ≤ µ,
P (‖p (Xn|Y n, θ)− p (Xn|VB , Y n, θ) ‖TV ≥ µ) ≤ µ.
It is clear that an (n, δ, µ)-private protocol is also (n, δ, µ)-
weakly private.
Definition 3. A pair (α, β) ∈ R2+ is said to be achievable if
there exists a sequence of (n, δn, µn)-private protocols such
that
lim sup
n→∞
− 1
n
log δn ≥ α,
lim sup
n→∞
− 1
n
logµn ≥ β.
The closure of the set of all achievable pairs is the correctness-
privacy error exponent region R.
IV. RESULTS
If Alice and Bob do not have access to correlated random
variables, i.e., WA,WB are independent, we argue using the
following example that meaningful private hypothesis testing
may not be possible. This will imply that the same holds true
even if users share common randomness in addition since
the honest-but-curious users may share part of their private
randomness at the outset.
Example 1. Let X,Y be distributed i.i.d. ∼ Bernoulli( 12 ) un-
der the null hypothesis (Θ = 0), and X = Y ∼ Bernoulli( 12 )
under the alternate hypothesis (Θ = 1).
For this example, we show that it is impossible to realize
even weakly private hypothesis testing for small correctness
and privacy error using arbitrarily large number of samples.
We do this by providing a black box reduction of the statisti-
cally secure 2-party computation of a function, which is known
to be impossible, to weakly private hypothesis testing protocol.
This proof can be extended to show the impossibility of
weakly private hypothesis testing of independence in general,
i.e., the null hypothesis is a joint distribution PXY and the
alternate hypothesis the independent distribution PX ·PY . The
result is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For the hypothesis testing problem described
in Example 1, (n, δ, µ)-weakly private distributed hypothesis
testing is impossible for all n ∈ N, when δ, µ ≤ 112 .
To enable private hypothesis testing we will assume in
the sequel that Alice and Bob have access to independent
copies of non-trivially correlated random variables WA,WB .
By non-trivial correlations we mean the large class of corre-
lations [27]–[29] that are complete for secure 2-party com-
putation. Without loss of generality, we consider WA,WB
which are independent copies of oblivious transfer correlations
(Definition 4) in our positive results.
Our main result is the following characterization of the
correctness-privacy error exponent region:
P0XY P1XY
QXY
α α
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Fig. 1: From left to right, the diagrams illustrate the conditions (i), (ii) and (iv) (for θ = 0) in Theorem 3, respectively. In the figure, for θ = 0, 1, the set
around PθXY encloses all distributions TXY s.t. D(TXY ‖ PθXY ) ≤ α, and the set around QX · PθY |X encloses all conditional distributions TY |X s.t.
D(TY |X ‖ PθY |X | QX) ≤ β. Note that, for any QX , D(QX · PθY |X ‖ PθXY ) = D(QX ‖ PθX).
Theorem 3. For the binary distributed hypothesis testing
problem, correctness-privacy error exponent (α, β) is achiev-
able if and only if the following conditions are satisfied. There
exists no distribution QXY for which any of the following
conditions hold,
(i).
D(QXY ‖ PθXY ) ≤ α,∀θ ∈ {0, 1}. (4)
(ii).
D(QX ‖ PθX) ≤ α,
and D(QY |X ‖ PθY |X | QX) ≤ β,∀θ ∈ {0, 1}. (5)
(iii).
D(QY ‖ PθY ) ≤ α,
and D(QX|Y ‖ PθX|Y | QY ) ≤ β,∀θ ∈ {0, 1}.
(iv).
D(QXY ‖ PθXY ) ≤ α,D(QX ‖ P1−θX ) ≤ α,
and D(QY |X ‖ P1−θY |X | QX) ≤ β,∀θ ∈ {0, 1}. (6)
(v).
D(QXY ‖ PθXY ) ≤ α,D(QY ‖ P1−θY ) ≤ α,
and D(QX|Y ‖ P1−θX|Y | QY ) ≤ β,∀θ ∈ {0, 1}.
We prove this by effectively reducing the problem to MPC
of a decision function. The trade-off above is the best possible
for any decision function. The intuition behind the conditions
in the theorem are as follows: See Figure 1 which illustrates
the conditions (i), (ii) and (iv). Condition (i) simply follows
from the error exponent for non-private hypothesis testing
where the optimal error exponent can be obtained by deciding
in favor of the hypothesis θ which minimizes D(QXY ‖ PθXY )
where QXY is the type of the observation. In condition (ii),
the observed type QXY is such that D(QX ‖ PθX) ≤ α for
both θ = 0, 1, i.e., to obtain the prescribed error exponent,
Alice may not make a decision simply based on her observed
vector. Now, to ensure a privacy error exponent against Alice
of at least β, for all observed conditional types QY |X such
that D(QY |X ‖ PθY |X | QX) ≤ β, her decision must be θ.
This leads to (ii). Condition (iv) arises from an interplay of
Alice’s correctness condition for one of the hypotheses and her
privacy condition for the other. As before, the observed type
QXY is such that D(QX ‖ PθX) ≤ α for both θ = 0, 1 and
Alice may not make a decision only based on her observation.
Correctness condition for the hypothesis θ requires that, if
D(QXY ‖ PθXY ) ≤ α, she must decide in favor of θ, but,
privacy requires that, if D(QY |X ‖ P1−θY |X | QX) ≤ β, her
decision must be 1−θ. This gives rise to (iv). Conditions (iii)
and (v) are analogous to (ii) and (iv), respectively, from Bob’s
side.
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Fig. 2: The optimal correctness-privacy error exponent trade-off for the
decision problem with null hypothesis: P0(0, 0) = P0(0, 1) = P0(1, 1) = 1
3
and alternate hypothesis: P1(0, 0) = 2
3
,P1(1, 1) = 1
3
. Log is computed with
base 2
V. PROOF SKETCHES
In this section we provide the proof sketches of the results
provided in Section IV. The detailed proofs are provided in
the Appendix. Before we prove Theorem 2, we state the
following well known result that shows the impossibility of
secure computation of AND function. Let fAND denote the
AND function, i.e., fAND(x, y) = x ∧ y for x, y ∈ {0, 1}.
Theorem 4. [31] When Alice and Bob receive u, v ∈
{0, 1}, respectively, and have access to WA,WB , respectively,
where WA,WB are independent, it is impossible to compute
fAND(u, v) with 16 -security, i.e., there exists no protocol pi that
satisfies the following properties.
PĤA|U,V (ĤA 6= fAND(U, V )|u, v) ≤
1
6
, (7)
PĤB |U,V (ĤB 6= fAND(U, V )|u, v) ≤
1
6
, (8)
‖p (VA|U = 0, V = 0)− p (VA|U = 0, V = 1) ‖TV
≤ 1
6
, (9)
‖p (VB |U = 0, V = 0)− p (VB |U = 1, V = 0) ‖TV
≤ 1
6
. (10)
A. Proof Sketch for Theorem 2
Given a (n, δ, µ)-weakly private protocol pi for the hy-
pothesis testing problem described in Example 1, we con-
struct a τ -secure protocol pi∧ for computing fAND, where
τ = max(δ, 2µ). The impossibility of pi now follows from
Theorem 4 which states that such a pi∧ is impossible since
τ = 16 .
Description of pi∧: When Alice and Bob receive u, v ∈
{0, 1}, respectively as input.
1) Alice samples Zn uniformly from {0, 1}n and sends it
to Bob.
2) If u = 1, Alice sets Xn = Zn, else Xn = Xˆn, where
Xˆn is uniform in {0, 1}n and independent of Zn.
3) If v = 1, Bob sets Y n = Zn, else Y n = Yˆ n, where Yˆ n
is uniform in {0, 1}n and independent of Zn.
4) Alice and Bob execute pi with Xn, Y n as inputs, respec-
tively, and output whatever pi outputs.
Claim 5. pi∧ computes fAND with τ -security.
Proof sketch. When ∧(u, v) = 1, inputs of Alice and Bob in
pi, viz. Xn, Y n, come according to the hypothesis Xn = Y n
(i.e., alt. hypothesis, Θ = 1), and when ∧(u, v) = 0, Xn
and Y n are independent (i.e., null hypothesis, Θ = 0). That
pi∧ satisfies condition (7) and (8), now follows from the δ-
correctness of pi.
Next we show that pi∧ satisfies the condition (9); that it
satisfies (10) can be shown similarly.
When (u, v) = (0, 0), Alice’s view VA =
(Zn, V piA (Xˆ
n, Yˆ n)), where V piA (Xˆ
n, Yˆ n) is the view of
Alice when pi is executed with Xˆn, Yˆ n as inputs of Alice
and Bob, respectively. Note that V piA (Xˆ
n, Yˆ n) consists of
Xˆn,WA and the transcript of the protocol pi. Similarly, when
(u, v) = (0, 1), VA = (Zn, V piA (Xˆ
n, Zn)). The following
claim, proved in the Appendix, shows that the statistical
distance between Alice’s views in these two cases is at most
2µ.
Claim 6. If pi is µ-weakly private, when Zn, Xˆn, Yˆ n are
independently and uniformly distributed in {0, 1}n,
‖p
(
Zn, V piA (Xˆ
n, Zn)
)
− p
(
Zn, V piA (Xˆ
n, Yˆ n)
)
‖TV ≤ 2µ.
Claim 5, 6 and Theorem 4 together imply the impossibility of
pi, proving the theorem.
B. Proof Sketch for Theorem 3 (Converse)
Overview: The proof proceeds in two steps. In Lemma 7,
we show that if a protocol has small correctness and privacy
error, when Alice and Bob observe only the input and output
of the decision function (as if the users were simply given
the outputs of the decision functions by a genie), correctness
and privacy error is small with respect to an average notion of
privacy. In the second step, we show the converse by providing
an upper bound on correctness-privacy error exponent region
of such functions (Lemma 8) with respect to the above
mentioned notion of privacy.
In the sequel, for brevity, we will often represent
ΛA(X
n, Y n) (resp. ΛB(Xn, Y n)) by ΛA (resp. ΛB) whenever
it does not cause confusion.
Lemma 7. Given a (n, δ, µ)-private binary hypothesis testing
protocol pi, let ΛA,ΛB be randomized boolean functions such
that for all x, y,
p
(
ĤA|x, y
)
≡ p (ΛA(Xn, Y n)|x, y) ,
p
(
ĤB |x, y
)
≡ p (ΛB(Xn, Y n)|x, y) ,
where (≡) denotes identical distributions. Then,
(i). PΛA|Θ(1− θ|θ) ≤ δ and PΛB |Θ(1− θ|θ) ≤ δ
(ii). For θ = 0, 1, for all xn ∈ Xn,∑
i∈{0,1}
PΛA|Xn,Θ(i|xn, θ)
· ‖p (Y n|xn, θ)− p (Y n|ΛA = i, xn, θ) ‖TV ≤ 2µ.
For θ = 0, 1, for all yn ∈ Yn,∑
i∈{0,1}
PΛB |Y n,Θ(i|yn, θ)
· ‖p (Xn|yn, θ)− p (Xn|ΛB = i, yn, θ) ‖TV ≤ 2µ.
Proof sketch. Essentially, ΛA,ΛB are the decision functions
computed by Alice and Bob, respectively, in the protocol pi.
The statement about correctness (i) directly follows from this
observation. For θ = 0, 1 and for all xn ∈ Xn, The privacy
statement (ii) for ΛA can be shown using a simple averaging
argument on µ-privacy of pi. The privacy statement for ΛB
can be shown similarly.
We now proceed to the second step of the proof. If
correctness-privacy error exponent (α, β) is achievable, then
there exists a sequence of protocols (pini)i∈N such that, pini
is a (ni, δi, µi)-private binary hypothesis testing protocol such
that,
lim
i→∞
− 1
ni
log δni ≥ α, lim
i→∞
− 1
ni
logµni ≥ β.
Appealing to Lemma 7, for each ni, we construct
boolean randomized functions (ΛniA ,Λ
ni
B ) from pini . Since
pini is a (ni, δi, µi)-private binary hypothesis testing protocol,
(ΛniA ,Λ
ni
B ) satisfy conditions (i), (ii) in Lemma 7 w.r.t. the
parameters δi and µi. In the next lemma, we show the
necessity of conditions (i), (ii) and (iv) in Theorem 3 using the
sequence of functions, (ΛniA )i∈N. The necessity of conditions
(iii) and (v) can be shown similarly by analyzing (ΛniB )i∈N.
Thus, it remains to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Let (ΛniA )i∈N be a sequence of randomized boolean
functions that satisfy the following properties for each ni.
(i). PΛniA (Xni ,Y ni )|Θ(1− θ|θ) ≤ δni for θ = 0, 1,
(ii). For θ = 0, 1, for all xni ∈ Xni ,∑
i=0,1
PΛniA |Xni ,Θ(i|x
ni , θ)·
‖p (Y ni |xni , θ)− p (Y ni |ΛniA , xni , θ) ‖TV
≤ 2µni .
If α, β are such that,
α ≤ lim
i→∞
− 1
ni
log δni , β ≤ lim
i→∞
− 1
ni
logµni ,
then (α, β) must satisfy conditions (i), (ii) and (iv) in Theo-
rem 3.
Proof sketch. The following two claims are proved in the
Appendix.
Claim 9. For θ = 0, 1, for large enough n in the sequence
(ni)i∈N, if QXY ∈ PnX×Y and D(QXY ‖ PθXY ) < α, then
P(Xn ∈ S|Xn ∈ QX ,Θ = θ) ≥ 99100 , where,
S = {xn ∈ TnX (QX) :∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY ) P(ΛA = θ|x
n, yn)
|{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )}|
≥ 99
100
}. (11)
Claim 10. For θ = 0, 1, for large enough n in the se-
quence (ni)i∈N, if QXY ∈ PnX×Y , D(QX ‖ PθX) < α, and
D(QY |X ‖ PθY |X | Q(x)) < β, then P(Xn ∈ S|Xn ∈
QX ,Θ = θ) ≥ 99100 , where,
S = {xn ∈ TnX (QX) :∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY ) P(ΛA = θ|x
n, yn)
|{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )}|
≥ 80
100
}. (12)
If there exists QXY that satisfies the inequalities in (4),
then by Claim 9, for large enough n, Condition (11) would be
satisfied for θ = 0 and 1 for some xn ∈ QX ; a contradiction.
This proves the necessity of condition (i) in the theorem.
If there exists QXY that satisfies the inequalities in (5),
by Claim 10, for large enough n, Condition (12) would be
satisfied for θ = 0 and θ = 1 for some xn ∈ QX ; a
contradiction. This proves the necessity of Condition (ii).
If there exists QXY that satisfies the inequalities in (6), then
for large enough n, by Claim 9 and (11) would be satisfied
for θ and 1−θ, respectively, by Claim 10 and Condition (12),
respectively; again a contradiction. This proves the necessity
of Condition (iv).
Note that the claims work only for distributions QXY with
rational p.d.f. But for QXY with irrational p.d.f, we may appeal
to continuity of KL divergence to get a distribution Q′XY with
rational p.d.f that is arbitrarily close to QXY . This proves the
lemma, and hence the theorem.
C. Proof Sketch for Theorem 3 (Achievability)
Overview: To show achievability, we first construct a
sequence of decision functions (ΛnA,Λ
n
B)n∈N for Alice and
Bob, respectively, with the following property. If Alice and
Bob observe only the input and output of their corresponding
decision functions, then the correctness-privacy error exponent
achieved by this sequence of decision functions match the
region described by the theorem. We would then compute
these functions using perfectly secure protocols. The view of
such protocol reveals no more information than the input and
output of the computed function.
Description of ΛnA and Λ
n
B: Fix QXY ∈ PnX×Y . For all
(xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY ) and θ ∈ {0, 1}, ΛnA(xn, yn) = θ if
one of the following condition is satisfied and ΛnA(x
n, yn) = 0
otherwise.
D(QXY ‖ PθXY ) ≤ α,
(D(QX ‖ PθX) ≤ α) ∧ (D(QX ‖ P1−θX ) > α),
(D(QX ‖ PθX) ≤ α) ∧ (D(QY |X ‖ PθY |X | QX) ≤ β).
Similarly, for θ ∈ {0, 1}, ΛnB(xn, yn) = θ if one of the
following condition is satisfied and ΛnB(x
n, yn) = 0 otherwise.
D(QXY ‖ PθXY ) ≤ α,
(D(QY ‖ PθY ) ≤ α) ∧ (D(QY ‖ P1−θY ) > α),
(D(QY ‖ PθY ) ≤ α) ∧ (D(QX|Y ‖ PθX|Y | QY ) ≤ β).
Note that when (α, β) satisfy conditions (i)-(v) in Theorem 3,
the above functions map each (xn, yn) uniquely to either 0 or
1, and are hence well defined.
Claim 11. For the sequence of decision functions
(ΛnA,Λ
n
B)n∈N, ∃(δn, µn)n∈N such that for all n ∈ N
and all θ ∈ {0, 1},
PΛnA|Θ(1− θ|θ) ≤ δn, PΛnB |Θ(1− θ|θ) ≤ δn,
P (‖p (Y n|xn, θ)− p (Y n|xn,ΛnA, θ) ‖TV ≥ µn) ≤ µn,∀xn,
P (‖p (Xn|yn, θ)− p (Xn|yn,ΛnB , θ) ‖TV ≥ µn) ≤ µn,∀yn,
and
α = lim
n→∞−
1
n
log δn, β = lim
n→∞−
1
n
logµn.
We now appeal to the following theorem, proved in the
Appendix, to obtain a sequence of protocols (pin)n∈N from
(ΛnA,Λ
n
B)n∈N such that pin is (n, δn, µn)-private. This proves
the achievability.
Definition 4. An oblivious transfer (OT) correlation consists
of random variables WA,WB , where WA = (R0, R1) and
WB = (B,RB), where R0, R1, B i.i.d. ∼ Bernoulli( 12 ).
Theorem 12. Let ΛA,ΛB : X × Y → {0, 1} be a pair of
randomized boolean functions. For sufficiently large k, when
WA,WB consists of k copies of OT correlations, there exists
a protocol pi, with the following guarantees.
p
(
ĤA|X = x, Y = y
)
≡ p (ΛA(x, y)) ,∀x, y,
p
(
ĤB |X = x, Y = y
)
≡ p (ΛB(x, y)) ,∀x, y.
For θ = 0, 1, when µ ≥ 0,
P(‖p (Y |x, θ)− p (Y |ΛA, x, θ) ‖TV ≥ µ) ≤ µ
=⇒ P(‖p (Y |x, θ)− p (Y |VA, x, wA, θ) ‖TV ≥ µ) ≤ µ,
∀x,wA,
P(‖p (X|y, θ)− p (X|ΛB , y, θ) ‖TV ≥ µ) ≤ µ
=⇒ P(‖p (X|y, θ)− p (X|VB , y, wB , θ) ‖TV ≥ µ) ≤ µ,
∀y, wB .
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APPENDIX A
SOME USEFUL LEMMAS
We would use the following Lemmas in the proofs of our results. This section can be referred to when needed in the main
proofs.
Lemma 13. For the joint distribution described in (1), the following statements are true.
1) For θ = 0, 1,
P (‖p (Y n|Xn,Θ = θ)− p (Y n|VA,Θ = θ) ‖TV ≥ µ) ≤ µ
=⇒
∑
xn∈Xn,vA∈VA
PXn,VA|Θ(x
n, vA|θ)‖p (Y n|xn, θ)− p (Y n|vA, θ) ‖TV ≤ 2µ. (13)
2) For θ = 0, 1, and any xn ∈ Xn,
P (‖p (Y n|xn,Θ = θ)− p (Y n|VA, xn,Θ = θ) ‖TV ≥ µ) ≤ µ
=⇒
∑
vA∈VA
PVA|Xn,Θ(vA|xn, θ)‖p (Y n|xn, θ)− p (Y n|vA, θ) ‖TV ≤ 2µ. (14)
Proof. Define set S ⊆ Xn × VA such that (xn, vA) ∈ S if and only if
‖p (Y n|xn,Θ = θ)− p (Y n|vA,Θ = θ) ‖TV ≥ µ.
By the assumption P(S) ≤ µ. We can bound the RHS of the statement (13) as follows.∑
(xn,vA)∈S
PXn,VA|Θ(x
n, vA|θ)‖p (Y n|xn, θ)− p (Y n|vA, θ) ‖TV
+
∑
(xn,vA)/∈S
PXn,VA|Θ(x
n, vA|θ)‖p (Y n|xn, θ)− p (Y n|vA, θ) ‖TV.
The first term in the above expression can be bounded by µ since P(S) ≤ µ and statistical distance is upper bounded by 1. The
second term can be bounded by µ since the statistical distance in the term is at most µ by the definition of S. Statement (14)
lemma can be proved identically.
Lemma 14. Let Q ∈ PnX×Y , for a fixed xn (of appropriate type),
2−n(D(QY |X ‖ P
θ
Y |X | QX)+|X×Y| log 2nn ) ≤
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnXn×Yn (QXY )
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ) ≤ 2−n(D(QY |X ‖ P
θ
Y |X | QX))
Proof. For any (xn, yn) : Txn,yn = QXY ,
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ) =
∏
(x,y)∈X×Y
(
PY |X,Θ(y|x, θ)
)n·QXY (x,y)
Hence, ∑
yn:T(xn,yn)=QXY
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ) = |{yn : T(xn,yn) = QXY }| ·
∏
(x,y)∈X×Y
(
PY |X,Θ(y|x, θ)
)n·QXY (x,y)
. (15)
Before we bound the size of the set {yn : T(xn,yn) = QXY }, we quote the following theorem verbatim from [30].
Theorem 15. [30, Theorem 11.1.3] For any type class QX ∈ PnX ,
1
(n+ 1)|X |
2nH(QX) ≤ |TnX (QX)| ≤ 2nH(QX).
Observe that,
|{yn : T(xn,yn) = QXY }| =
∏
x∈X
∣∣∣{yn·QX(x) ∈ Yn·QX(x) : Tyn·QX (x) = QY |X=x}∣∣∣ .
By using Theorem 15, we may bound this as∏
x∈X
1
(n+ 1)|X |
2n·QX(x)·H(QY |X=x) ≤ |{yn : T(xn,yn) = QXY }| ≤
∏
x∈X
2n·QX(x)·H(QY |X=x).
Using the above observation and the equality (15), we get the following lower bound,
log
∑
yn:T(xn,yn)=QXY
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)
≥
∑
x∈X
−n ·QX(x)
∑
y∈Y
QY |X(y|x) logQY |X(y|x) + |Y| log 2n
n
+ ∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
n ·QXY (x, y) logPθY |X(y|x)
=− n
 ∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
QXY (x, y) log
QY |X(y|x)
PθY |X(y|x)
+
|X × Y| log 2n
n
 = −n(D(QY |X ‖ P θY |X | QX) + |X × Y| log 2nn
)
.
Using the above observation and the equality (15), we get the following upper bound,
log
∑
yn:T(xn,yn)=QXY
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)
≤
∑
x∈X
−n ·QX(x)
∑
y∈Y
QY |X(y|x) logQY |X(y|x)
+ ∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
n ·QXY (x, y) logPθY |X(y|x)
=− n
 ∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
QXY (x, y) log
QY |X(y|x)
PθY |X(y|x)
 = −n(D(QY |X ‖ P θY |X | QX)) .
This proves the claim.
APPENDIX B
EXAMPLE: MISSING PROOFS
Proof of Claim 6. The statistical distance given in the claim may be expanded as follows.
‖p
(
Zn, V piA (Xˆ
n, Zn)
)
− p
(
Zn, V piA (Xˆ
n, Yˆ n)
)
‖TV
= ‖p
(
Zn, Xˆn, V piA (Xˆ
n, Zn)
)
− p
(
Zn, Xˆn, V piA (Xˆ
n, Yˆ n)
)
‖TV
=
1
2
∑
(zn,xn,vA)∈Wn×Xn×VA
∣∣∣PZn,Xˆn,V piA (Xˆn,Zn)(zn, xn, vA)− PZn,Xˆn,V piA (Xˆn,Yˆ n)(zn, xn, vA)∣∣∣
(a)
=
1
2
∑
(zn,xn,vA)∈Wn×Xn×VA
∣∣∣PZn,Xˆn(zn, xn) · (PV piA (Xˆn,Zn)|Xˆn,Zn(vA|xn, zn)− PV piA (Xˆn,Yˆ n)|Xˆn(vA|xn))∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
(xn,zn)∈Xn×Wn
P(xn, zn) ·
∑
vA∈VA
∣∣∣PV piA (Xˆn,Zn)|Xˆn,Zn(vA|xn, zn)− PV piA (Xˆn,Yˆ n)|Xˆn(vA|xn)∣∣∣
(b)
=
1
2
∑
(xn,zn)∈Xn×Wn
P(xn, zn) ·
∑
vA∈VA
|Term 1− Term 2|
where,
Term 1 =
PV piA (Xˆn,Zn)|Xˆn(vA|x
n) · PZn|V piA (Xˆn,Zn),Xˆn(z
n|vA, xn)
PZn|Xˆn(z
n|xn)
Term 2 =
PV piA (Xˆn,Yˆ n)|Xˆn(vA|x
n) · PZn|Xˆn(zn|xn)
PZn|Xˆn(z
n|xn) .
In (a), we used the independence of Yˆ n and Zn and (b) expands the conditional probability using Bayes’s Theorem. Since
(Xˆn, Yˆ n) and (Xˆn, Zn) are identically distributed, for all xn, va,
PV piA (Xˆn,Zn)|Xˆn(vA|x
n) = PV piA (Xˆn,Yˆ n)|Xˆn(vA|x
n) for all xn ∈ Xn, vA ∈ VA.
Using this, the above expression can be simplified as,
1
2
∑
(xn,zn)∈Xn×Wn
P(xn, zn) ·
∑
vA∈VA
PV piA (Xˆn,Zn)|Xˆn(vA|x
n)
PZn|Xˆn(z
n|xn)
∣∣∣PZn|V piA (Xˆn,Zn),Xˆn(zn|vA, xn)− PZn|Xˆn(zn|xn)∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
xn∈Xn
P(xn) ·
∑
vA∈VA
PV piA (Xˆn,Zn)|Xˆn(vA|x
n) ·
∑
zn∈Wn
∣∣∣PZn|V piA (Xˆn,Zn),Xˆn(zn|vA, xn)− PZn|Xˆn(zn|xn)∣∣∣
(a)
=
1
2
∑
(xn,vA)∈Xn×VA
PXˆn,VA|Θ=0(x
n, vA) ·
∑
zn∈Wn
∣∣∣PZn|V piA (Xˆn,Zn),Xˆn(zn|vA, xn)− PZn|Xˆn(zn|xn)∣∣∣
(b)
=
∑
(xn,vA)∈Xn×VA
PXˆn,VA|Θ=0(x
n, vA) · ‖p (zn|vA,Θ = 0)− p (zn|xn,Θ = 0) ‖TV
(c)
≤ 2µ.
In (a), we used the equality P(xn) · PV piA (Xˆn,Zn)|Xˆn(vA|x
n) = PV piA (Xˆn,Zn),Xˆn(vA, x
n). This follows from the description of
the joint distribution (1) and the fact that Θ = 0 since Xˆn and Zn are independent. (b) uses the definition of statistical distance
and (c) follows from Lemma 13.
APPENDIX C
CONVERSE: MISSING PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 7. The correctness condition (i) follows directly from the definition of ΛA and ΛB and δ-correctness of pi.
We prove statement (ii) by an averaging argument. Since ĤA = ψA(VA) (resp. ĤB = ψB(VB)) is a deterministic function of
VA (resp. VB), and since PΛA|Xn,Y n(i|xn, yn) = PĤA|Xn,Y n(i|xn, yn) for all xn, yn,
PY n|ΛA,Xn,Θ(y
n|i, xn, θ) = PY n|ĤA,Xn,Θ(yn|i, xn, θ) =
∑
vA∈VA
PY n,VA|ĤA,Xn,Θ(y
n, vA|i, xn, θ)
=
∑
vA∈VA
PVA|ĤA,Xn,Θ(vA|i, xn, θ) · PY n|VA,ĤA,Xn,Θ(yn|vA, i, xn, θ)
(a)
=
∑
vA:ψA(vA)=i
PVA|Xn,Θ(vA|xn, θ)
PĤA|Xn,Θ(i|xn, θ)
· PY n|VA,Θ(yn|vA, θ)
Here, (a) crucially uses the fact that xn, i are part of the view vA. Using the above observation we proceed as follows,
1∑
i=0
PΛA|Xn,Θ(i|xn, θ) · (‖p (Y n|xn, θ)− p (Y n|ΛA = i, xn, θ) ‖TV)
=
1∑
i=0
PĤA|Xn,Θ(i|xn, θ) ·
1
2
∑
yn∈Yn
∣∣PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)− PY n|ΛA,Xn,Θ(yn|i, xn, θ)∣∣
=
1∑
i=0
PĤA|Xn,Θ(i|xn, θ) ·
1
2
∑
yn∈Yn
∣∣∣∣∣∣PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)−
∑
vA:ψA(vA)=i
PVA|Xn,Θ(vA|xn, θ)
PĤA|Xn,Θ(i|xn, θ)
· PY n|VA,Θ(yn|vA, θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(a)
≤
1∑
i=0
PĤA|Xn,Θ(i|xn, θ) ·
1
2
∑
yn∈Yn
∑
vA:ψA(vA)=i
PVA|Xn,Θ(vA|xn, θ)
PĤA|Xn,Θ(i|xn, θ)
· ∣∣PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)− PY n|VA,Θ(yn|vA, θ)∣∣
=
1∑
i=0
∑
vA:ψA(vA)=i
PVA|Xn,Θ(vA|xn, θ) ·
1
2
∑
yn∈Yn
· ∣∣PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)− PY n|VA,Θ(yn|vA, θ)∣∣
=
∑
vA∈V
PVA|Xn,Θ(vA|xn, θ) ·
1
2
∑
yn∈Yn
· ∣∣PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)− PY n|VA,Θ(yn|vA, θ)∣∣
=
∑
vA∈V
PVA|Xn,Θ(vA|xn, θ) · ‖p (Y n|xn, θ)− p (Y n|vA, θ) ‖TV
(b)
≤ 2µ.
Here, (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality for absolute value function and (b) follows from Lemma 13. This proves the
lemma.
Proof of Lemma 8. We will first prove the following two claims.
Claim 9. For θ = 0, 1, for large enough n in the sequence (ni)i∈N, if QXY ∈ PnX×Y and D(QXY ‖ PθXY ) < α, P(Xn ∈
S|Xn ∈ TnX (QX),Θ = θ) ≥ 99100 , where,
S = {xn ∈ TnX (QX) :
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY ) P(ΛA = θ|x
n, yn)
|{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )}|
≥ 99
100
}.
Proof. For τ > 0, let D(QXY ‖ PθXY ) = α − τ . For some τ ′ < τ , choose n from the sequence (ni)i∈N such that α − τ ′ ≤
− 1n log δn. Hence, we have, PΛnA|Θ(1− θ|θ) ≤ 2−n·(α−τ
′).
2−n·(α−τ
′) ≥ PΛnA|Θ(1− θ|θ)
≥ P ((Xn, Y n) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )|Θ = θ)P (ΛnA = 1− θ|(Xn, Y n) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY ),Θ = θ)
We expand the last expression as,
P
(
(Xn, Y n) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )|Θ = θ
)∑
(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY )
P
(
(Xn, Y n) = (xn, yn)|(Xn, Y n) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY ),Θ = θ
)
P (ΛnA = 1− θ|(Xn, Y n) = (xn, yn),Θ = θ) .
In the above expression, since the probability of every member of a typeclass is the same irrespective of the hypothesis,
P
(
(Xn, Y n) = (xn, yn)|(Xn, Y n) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY ),Θ = θ
)
= 1|TnX×Y(QXY )| . Additionally, ΛA is independent of Θ conditioned
on (xn, yn). Hence, from the above observations we get the following inequality.
2−n·(α−τ
′) ≥ P ((Xn, Y n) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )|Θ = θ) · 1∣∣TnX×Y(QXY )∣∣
∑
(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY )
P (ΛnA = 1− θ|(Xn, Y n) = (xn, yn)) .
By Theorem 11.1.4 in [30], we have,
P
(
(Xn, Y n) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )|Θ = θ
) ≥ 1
(n+ 1)|X×Y|
2−n·D(QXY ‖ P
θ
XY ) =
1
(n+ 1)|X×Y|
2−n·(α−τ).
Hence,
1∣∣TnX×Y(QXY )∣∣
∑
(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY )
P (ΛnA = 1− θ|(Xn, Y n) = (xn, yn))
≤ 1
(n+ 1)|X×Y|
2−n·(α−τ
′) · 2n·(α−τ) = 1
(n+ 1)|X×Y|
2−n·(τ−τ
′).
Choose n large enough to guarantee, 1
(n+1)|X×Y| 2
−n·(τ−τ ′) ≤ 1104 . Towards a contradiction, suppose P(Xn ∈ S|Xn ∈ QX ,Θ =
θ) < 99100 . Then,
1∣∣TnX×Y(QXY )∣∣
∑
(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY )
P (ΛnA = 1− θ|(Xn, Y n) = (xn, yn))
≥ 1∣∣TnX×Y(QXY )∣∣
∑
xn /∈S
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY ) P(ΛA = 1− θ|x
n, yn)
|{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )}|
· |{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )}|
>
1
100
∑
xn /∈S |{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )}|∣∣TnX×Y(QXY )∣∣ = 1100
∑
xn /∈S |{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )}|∑
xn∈TnX (QX) |{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ T
n
X×Y(QXY )}|
(a)
=
1
100
|S|
|TnX (QX)|
(b)
=
1
100
P(Xn /∈ S|Xn ∈ TnX (QX),Θ = θ) >
1
104
.
In (a), we crucially use the fact that the size of the set {yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )} is the same for all xn ∈ TnX (QX). In
(b), we use the fact that |S||TnX (QX)| = P(X
n /∈ S|Xn ∈ TnX (QX),Θ = θ) irrespective of the value of θ. The above contradiction
proves the claim.
Claim 10. For θ = 0, 1, for all large values n in the sequence (ni)i∈N, if QXY ∈ PnX×Y , D(QX ‖ PθX) < α, and
D(QY |X ‖ PθY |X | Q(x)) < β then, P(Xn ∈ S|Xn ∈ TnX (QX),Θ = θ) ≥ 99100 , where,
S = {xn ∈ TnX (QX) :
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY ) P(ΛA = θ|x
n, yn)
|{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )}|
≥ 80
100
}.
Proof. For τ > 0, let D(QY |X ‖ PθY |X | Q(x)) = β − τ . For some τ ′ < τ , choose n from the sequence (ni)i∈N such that
β− τ ′ ≤ − 1n logµn. Note that, D(QX ·PθY |X ‖ PθXY ) = D(QX ‖ PθX) < α. We would also require n to be large enough that
by to Claim 9, P(Xn ∈ R|Xn ∈ TnX (QX),Θ = θ) ≥ 99100 , where,
R = {xn ∈ TnX (QX) :
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PθY |X) P(Λ
n
A = θ|xn, yn)
|{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QX · PθY |X)}|
≥ 99
100
}. (16)
Consider xn ∈ R, we will first establish a lower bound of 95100 on PΛnA|Xn,Θ(θ|xn, θ). Towards a contradiction, suppose
PΛnA|Xn,Θ(θ|xn, θ) < 95100 . We note that the value of PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ) is the same for all (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QX · PY |X).
Let t denote this value. Then,∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X)
PY n|ΛnA,Xn,Θ(y
n|1− θ, xn, θ)
=
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X)
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ) · PΛnA|Xn,Y n,Θ(1− θ|xn, yn, θ)
PΛnA|Xn,Θ(1− θ|xn, θ)
(a)
= t · |{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QX · PθY |X)}|∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X)
PΛnA|Xn,Y n,Θ(1− θ|xn, yn, θ)
PΛnA|Xn,Θ(1− θ|xn, θ) · |{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QX · PθY |X)}|
(b)
=
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X)
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X) PΛnA|Xn,Y n,Θ(1− θ|x
n, yn, θ)
PΛnA|Xn,Θ(1− θ|xn, θ) · |{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QX · PθY |X)}|
(c)
≤
1
100
5
100
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X)
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ) = 1
5
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X)
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ). (17)
Equalities (a) and (b) follow from the definition of t. In (c), we use the fact that xn ∈ R (see definition of set R in (16)), and
our assumption that PΛnA|Xn,Θ(θ|xn, θ) ≤ 95100 . By the privacy condition (ii), we have,
2µn ≥
∑
i∈{0,1}
PΛnA|Xn,Θ(i|xn, θ) · ‖p (Y n|xn, θ)− p (Y n|ΛnA = i, xn, θ) ‖TV
≥ PΛnA|Xn,Θ(1− θ|xn, θ) · ‖p (Y n|xn, θ)− p (Y n|ΛnA = 1− θ, xn, θ) ‖TV
≥ 5
100
· 1
2
∑
yn∈Yn
∣∣∣PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)− PY n|ΛnA,Xn,Θ(yn|1− θ, xn, θ)∣∣∣
≥ 5
200
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X)
∣∣∣PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)− PY n|ΛnA,Xn,Θ(yn|1− θ, xn, θ)∣∣∣
(a)
=
5
200
· t ·
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X)
∣∣∣∣1− PY n|ΛnA,Xn,Θ(yn|1− θ, xn, θ)t
∣∣∣∣
(b)
≥ 5
200
· t ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X)
(
1− PY n|Λ
n
A,X
n,Θ(y
n|1− θ, xn, θ)
t
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
5
200
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X)
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)−
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X)
PY n|ΛnA,Xn,Θ(y
n|1− θ, xn, θ)
(c)
≥ 5
200
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X)
(
1− 1
5
)
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)
≥ 1
104
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X)
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)
(d)
≥ 1
104
2−n(D(P
θ
Y |X ‖ PθY |X | QX)+|X×Y| log 2nn ),
In (a) we use the the fact that PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ) is the same for all (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X), which we have respresented
by t. (b) follows from Jensen’s inequality, (c) from (17), and, finally, (d) follows from Lemma 14. Substituting for 2µn and
using the using the above bound, we get,
2 · 2−n·(β−τ ′) ≥ 2µn ≥ 1
104
2−n(|X×Y|
log 2n
n ).
For large values of n, this is a contradiction. Thus we have established that for all xn ∈ R, PΛnA|Xn,Θ(θ|xn, θ) ≥ 95100 .
For xn ∈ R, suppose ∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY ) P(ΛA = θ|x
n, yn)
|{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )}|
<
80
100
. (18)
Using an argument similar to the one used in showing (17),∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY )
PY n|ΛnA,Xn,Θ(y
n|θ, xn, θ)
=
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY )
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY ) PΛnA|Xn,Y n,Θ(θ|x
n, yn, θ)
PΛnA|Xn,Θ(θ|xn, θ) · |{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )}|
(a)
≤ 80
95
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY )
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ).
In (a), we used the bound PΛnA|Xn,Θ(θ|xn, θ) ≥ 95100 and our assumption (18).
By the privacy condition (ii), we have,
2µn ≥
∑
i∈{0,1}
PΛnA|Xn,Θ(i|xn, θ) · ‖p (Y n|xn, θ)− p (Y n|ΛnA = i, xn, θ) ‖TV
≥ PΛnA|Xn,Θ(θ|xn, θ) · ‖p (Y n|xn, θ)− p (Y n|ΛnA = θ, xn, θ) ‖TV
≥ 95
100
· 1
2
∑
yn∈Yn
∣∣∣PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)− PY n|ΛnA,Xn,Θ(yn|ΛnA = θ, xn, θ)∣∣∣
≥ 95
200
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY )
∣∣∣PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)− PY n|ΛnA,Xn,Θ(yn|θ, xn, θ)∣∣∣
≥ 95
100
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X)
(
1− 80
95
)
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ)
≥ 1
104
∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QX ·PY |X)
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, θ) ≥ 1
104
2−n(D(QY |X ‖ P
θ
Y |X | QX)+|X×Y| log 2nn ).
Substituting for 2µn and using the using the above bound, we get,
2 · 2−n·(β−τ ′) ≥ 2µn ≥ 1
104
2−n(β−τ+|X×Y|
log 2n
n ).
Since τ > τ ′, for large values of n, this is a contradiction. Thus we have established, as required by the claim, that for all
xn ∈ R, ∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY ) P(ΛA = θ|x
n, yn)
|{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )}|
≥ 80
100
.
If there exists QXY that satisfies the inequalities in (4), then by Claim 9, for large enough n, there exists xn such that for
θ = 0 and 1, ∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY ) P(ΛA = θ|x
n, yn)
|{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )}|
≥ 99
100
.
This is a contradiction, proving the necessity of condition (i) in the theorem.
If there exists QXY that satisfies the inequalities in (5), by Claim 10, for large enough n, there exists xn ∈ QX such that
for θ = 0 and 1, ∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY ) P(ΛA = θ|x
n, yn)
|{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )}|
≥ 80
100
.
This is also a contradiction, proving the necessity of Condition (ii).
If there exists QXY that satisfies the inequalities in (6), there exists xn and large enough n such that by Claim 9,∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY ) P(ΛA = θ|x
n, yn)
|{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )}|
≥ 99
100
,
and by Claim 10, ∑
yn:(xn,yn)∈TnX×Y(QXY ) P(ΛA = 1− θ|x
n, yn)
|{yn : (xn, yn) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY )}|
≥ 80
100
.
This is again a contradiction. This proves the necessity of Condition (iv).
Note that the claims work only for distributions QXY with rational p.d.f. But for QXY with irrational p.d.f, we may appeal
to continuity of KL divergence to get a distribution Q′XY with rational p.d.f that is arbitrarily close to QXY . This proves the
lemma.
APPENDIX D
ACHIEVABILITY: MISSING PROOFS
Proof of Claim 11. For our sequence of decision functions (ΛnA,Λ
n
B)n∈N, we derive (δn, µn)n∈N such that for all n ∈ N and
all θ ∈ {0, 1},
PΛnA|Θ(1− θ|θ) ≤ δn, PΛnB |Θ(1− θ|θ) ≤ δn,
P (‖p (Y n|xn)− p (Y n|xn,ΛnA, θ) ‖TV ≥ µn) ≤ µn,∀xn,
P (‖p (Xn|yn)− p (Xn|yn,ΛnB , θ) ‖TV ≥ µn) ≤ µn,∀yn,
and
α = lim
n→∞−
1
n
log δn, (19)
β = lim
n→∞−
1
n
logµn. (20)
ΛnA is defined such that for θ = 0, 1,
PΛA|Θ(1− θ|θ) ≤ PXn,Y n|Θ=θ((Xn, Y n) ∈ TnX×Y(QXY ) s.t. D(QXY ‖ PθXY ) > α|θ).
We now appeal to a weak version of Sanov’s theorem which we quote verbatim from [30].
Theorem 16 (Theorem 12.2.1, [30]). Let X1, . . . , Xn be i.i.d. ∼ PX . Then, for  > 0,
PXn(D(TXn ‖ PX) > ) ≤ 2−n(−|X|
log (n+1)
n ).
Hence, we have,
PΛA|Θ(1− θ|θ) ≤ 2−n(α−|X×Y|
log (n+1)
n ).
Using the same argument, we can show that,
PΛB |Θ(1− θ|θ) ≤ 2−n(α−|X×Y|
log (n+1)
n ).
Statement (19) follows directly from this observation.
To prove (20), we analyze ΛA, the analysis of ΛB is done similarly. We split the analysis into three cases based on the
type of xn ∈ Xn; (1) xn is such that D(Txn ‖ P0X), D(Txn ‖ P1X) > α; (2) xn is such that D(Txn ‖ PθX) ≤ α and
D(Txn ‖ P1−θX ) > α for θ = 0 or 1; (3) xn is such that D(Txn ‖ P0X), D(Txn ‖ P1X) ≤ α.
If D(Txn ‖ Pθ) > α for both θ = 0, 1, then ΛnA(xn, yn) = 0 for all yn ∈ Yn by the definition of ΛnA. Hence, in
this case, the decision is independent of the value of yn. From this, it follows that the distributions p (Y n|xn,Θ = θ) and
p (Y n|Λ(Xn, Y n) = 0, xn,Θ = θ) are identical.
Case (2) can also be analyzed similarly. If xn is such that D(Txn ‖ P0) ≤ α and D(Txn ‖ P1) > α, then ΛnA(xn, yn) = 0
for all yn ∈ Yn by the definition of ΛnA. Hence, in this case also, the decision is independent of the value of yn. From
this, it follows that the distributions p (Y n|xn,Θ = θ) and p (Y n|xn,Λ(Xn, Y n) = 0,Θ = θ) are identical. If xn is such that
D(Txn ‖ P1) ≤ α and D(Txn ‖ P0) > α, then ΛnA(xn, yn) = 1 for all yn ∈ Yn by the definition of ΛnA, hence the same
analysis applies.
For case (3), we show that for all xn,
P(‖p (Y n|xn,Θ = 0)− p (Y n|xn,ΛnA(Xn, Y n),Θ = 0) ‖TV) ≥ µn) ≤ µn,
such that (µn)n∈N satisfies Condition (20). The case where Θ = 1 can be shown similarly. For i = 0, 1, define
Si = {yn ∈ Yn : PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, 0) > PY n|Xn,ΛnA(Xn,Y n),Θ(yn|xn, i, 0)}.
Since ΛnA is a deterministic function, for all y
n ∈ Yn
PY n|Xn,ΛnA(Xn,Y n),Θ(y
n|xn, i, 0) =

PY n|Xn,Θ(y
n|xn,0)∑
yn:Λn
A
(xn,yn)=i PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn,0) ,∀y
n s.t. ΛnA(x
n, yn) = i,
0,∀yn s.t. ΛnA(xn, yn) = 1− i.
(21)
Hence yn ∈ S0 only if ΛnA(xn, yn) = 1. Then, by expanding the total variation distance, we get
‖p (Y n|xn,Θ = 0)− p (Y n|xn,ΛnA(Xn, Y n) = 0,Θ = 0) ‖TV
=
∑
yn∈S0
∣∣∣PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, 0)− PY n|Xn,ΛnA(Xn,Y n),Θ(yn|xn, 0, 0)∣∣∣
(a)
≤
∑
yn:ΛA(xn,yn)=1
∣∣∣PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, 0)− PY n|Xn,ΛnA(Xn,Y n),Θ(yn|xn, 0, 0)∣∣∣
(b)
≤
∑
yn:ΛA(xn,yn)=1
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, 0). (22)
Here, (a) is true since yn ∈ S0 only if ΛnA(xn, yn) = 1 and (b) follows from (21).
By the definition of ΛnA, when x
n is such that D(Txn ‖ P0) ≤ α, ΛnA(xn, yn) = 1 only if D(QY |X ‖ P0Y |X | QX) > β,
where T(xn,yn) = QXY . Define subset of types C = {QXY ∈ PnX×Y : Txn = QX and D(QY |X ‖ P0Y |X | QX) > β}. Then,∑
yn:ΛA(xn,yn)=1
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, 0) ≤
∑
QXY ∈C
∑
yn:T(xn,yn)=QXY
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, 0)
(a)
≤
∑
QXY ∈C
2−n(D(QY |X ‖ P
0
Y |X | QX))
(b)
≤ (n+ 1)|X×Y| · 2−nβ . (23)
Here, (a) follows from Lemma 14, and (b) follows from the fact that for all QXY ∈ C, D(QY |X ‖ P0Y |X | QX) > β and
|C| ≤ |PnX×Y | ≤ (n+ 1)|X×Y|. Hence we have, From the inequalities (22) and (23), we get
‖p (Y n|xn,Θ = 0)− p (Y n|xn,ΛnA(Xn, Y n) = 0,Θ = 0) ‖TV ≤ (n+ 1)|X×Y| · 2−nβ .
Hence,
P
(
‖p (Y n|xn,Θ = 0)− p (Y n|xn,ΛnA(Xn, Y n),Θ = 0) ‖TV ≥ 2(n+ 1)|X×Y| · 2−nβ
)
≤ PΛA(Xn,Y n)|Xn,Θ(1|xn, 0)
(a)
=
∑
yn:ΛA(xn,yn)=1
PY n|Xn,Θ(yn|xn, 0)
(b)
≤ (n+ 1)|X×Y| · 2−nβ .
In (a), we used the fact that ΛA is a deterministic function of xn, yn and (b) is already shown in (23). This proves the claim
when we set µn = 2(n+ 1)|X×Y| · 2−nβ .
Proof of Theorem 12. pi is essentially a perfectly secure protocol that computes ΛA(xn, yn) and ΛB(xn, yn) at Alice and
Bob, respectively, when Alice and Bob have xn and yn, respectively, as inputs. A well known result in secure multi-party
computation states that two parties can securely compute any pair of (possibly randomized) functions of their combined inputs
provided that they have access to sufficiently many copies of OT correlations [32, Section 2.4] and [33]. We state a version of
this fact as the following theorem. We will show that the protocol pi described in the theorem below satisfies the conditions in
our claim.
Theorem 17. Let ΛA,ΛB : X ×Y → {0, 1} be a pair of randomized boolean functions. For sufficiently large k, when WA,WB
consists of k copies of OT correlations, there exists a protocol pi, with the following guarantees.
p
(
ĤA|X = x, Y = y
)
≡ p (ΛA(x, y)) , and p
(
ĤB |X = x, Y = y
)
≡ p (ΛB(x, y)) ,∀x, y,
p
(
VA|X = x, ĤA = i
)
≡ p
(
VA|X = x, ĤA = i, Y = y
)
,∀x ∈ X , i ∈ {0, 1} and y ∈ Y s.t. PΛA(X,Y )|X,Y (i|x, y) > 0,
p
(
VB |Y = y, ĤB = i
)
≡ p
(
VB |Y = y, ĤB = i,X = x
)
,∀x ∈ X , i ∈ {0, 1} and y ∈ Y s.t. PΛA(X,Y )|X,Y (i|x, y) > 0.
Let vA ∈ VA such that ψA(vA) = i, and x and wA are part of the view vA, then
PY |VA,X,WA,Θ(y|vA, x, wA, θ) = PY |VA,X,WA,ĤA,Θ(y|vA, x, wA, i, θ)
=
PY |X,ĤA,Θ(y|x, i, θ) · PVA,WA|Y,X,ĤA,Θ(vA, wA|y, x, i, θ)
PVA,WA|X,ĤA,Θ(vA, wA|x, i, θ)
=
PY |X,ĤA,Θ(y|x, i, θ) · PVA|Y,X,ĤA,Θ(vA|y, x, i, θ)
PVA|X,ĤA,Θ(vA|x, i, θ)
(a)
= PY |X,ĤA,Θ(y|x, i, θ) = PY |X,ΛA,Θ(y|x, i, θ)
The above theorem guarantees that for all vA, x, y and i, PVA|Y,X,ĤA,Θ(vA|y, x, i, θ) = PVA|X,ĤA,Θ(vA|x, i, θ), (a) follows
from this observation. This proves the theorem.
